Privacy from a Historical Perspective by Kroeze, Ronald & Keulen, S.J.
VU Research Portal
Privacy from a Historical Perspective
Kroeze, Ronald; Keulen, S.J.
published in
The Handbook of Privacy Studies
2018
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Kroeze, R., & Keulen, S. J. (2018). Privacy from a Historical Perspective. In B. van der Sloot, & A. de Groot
(Eds.), The Handbook of Privacy Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction (pp. 21-56). Amsterdam University
Press.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
1. Privacy from a Historical Perspective
Sjoerd Keulen & Ronald Kroeze
1.1 Introduction
Privacy has never been a major topic for historians. After the first publication 
of a study on the concept of privacy in colonial history in 1972, it took another 
44 years before David Vincent published the f irst monograph on the history 
of privacy. However, over the last twenty years privacy has received more 
attention of historians, especially in an attempt to historicize growing 
concerns about modern surveillance techniques. This has indeed provided 
new insights into contemporary challenges as well as the history of privacy, 
for example that privacy has had different meanings and as an ideal came 
into existence under specif ic historical circumstances. Moreover, over the 
last 30 years concerns of privacy and privacy regulations have influenced 
the profession of historians.
Here it is important to stress that historians have their own research 
methods. They focus on continuity and change over time and pay ample 
attention to the context in which certain ideas and practices have developed.1 
The historical discipline’s main concern is therefore to understand the past 
on its own terms. The methodology historians use assumes that the past 
can only be made accessible through source criticism, the interpretation 
of sources and literature, and the construction of a historical narrative. 
Historical narratives may change when new sources are discovered, old 
sources are restudied with the help of new (digital) methods or when a new 
generation of historians asks new questions about the past informed by 
contemporary challenges.2 This explains why historians make a distinction 
between the past as such and historical narratives about the past. The 
latter, the history of history writing, is called historiography. Studying the 
historiographical trends in general and the historiography of the topic 
under scrutiny more precisely, is essential for historians. It provides insight 
into how historians have dealt with the past, the methods they have used, 
and the different interpretations of the same past that can (co)exist and 
the debates this variety has caused among historians.3 Understanding and 
1 Tosh 2010; Lorenz 2006.
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accepting these aspects is what might be called ‘historical awareness’, as 
the historiographer and methods historian John Tosh has stressed. It also 
includes being sceptical towards nostalgia (the past was better) and progress 
(the present and future are better than the past) as well as anachronism 
(‘the unthinking assumption that people in the past behaved and thought 
as we do’, as Tosh puts it).4
We are inclined to this understanding of history writing and offer a 
historical interpretation of privacy in this chapter. We touch upon some of 
the most important topics in Western(-European) history and historiography 
when it comes to the history of privacy. Other historians using a different 
geographical scope or other sources and methods may want to stress 
different developments.
In this chapter, we f irst look at the history of privacy by using a long-term 
perspective and by focusing on the broader context. Thereafter we discuss 
several classic texts, which provide a good entrance to understanding the 
turning points in the history of privacy. These classic texts can be viewed as 
essential sources for understanding various past meanings of privacy. In the 
third section we introduce the historiography of privacy. Here we discuss 
the main texts of historians on privacy as well as the different historical 
methods and historical schools and how they have contributed to different 
(and sometimes conflicting) understandings of privacy in history. As privacy 
is not only an object of study, we will discuss the challenges privacy holds 
for the (future) profession of historians in the f ifth section. We will f inish 
with some concluding remarks.
1.2 The meaning and function of privacy
Privacy is not a clear-cut concept. Neither today, nor in history. As present-
day dictionaries, such as the Merriam-Webster or Oxford Dictionary, already 
show, privacy can be def ined as freedom from unauthorized intrusion or 
one’s right to privacy, but also as (a place of) seclusion, secrecy, a private 
matter, and the state of being free from public attention. But as history shows, 
these interpretations have not always been around and were developed 
in specif ic historical circumstances. In this chapter we give a historical 
overview of how privacy has been understood throughout history. By using 
a long-term perspective and focusing on the broader context we illustrate 
that the concept of privacy was never f ixed, and that the discussions and 
4 Tosh 2010.
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discourses on privacy reflect the larger societal changes. We use the most 
common periodization in Western-European historiography. As we illustrate, 
the history of privacy can be traced back to Ancient Times but the rise of 
more modern and contemporary interpretations of privacy have been related 
to the premodern period (ca. 1500-1789) which includes the Renaissance, 
the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. The third period deals with The 
Long 19th Century, the era from the French Revolution until the First World 
War (1789-1914). The fourth period covers more or less the Short Twentieth 
Century (1914-1991), which includes two World Wars and the Cold War, and 
its aftermath. However, we also made an intervention in the periodization. 
Because the latest changes of privacy are very much influenced by the 
historical impact of new information technology we divided the twentieth 
century in a pre- and a post computer age, the latter starting in the 1970s.5 
To illustrate that the borders of the periodizations for privacy are not as 
strict as in for example political periodizations, we used round numbers.
As subthemes in every historical period we touch upon the most emergent 
changes in those time periods. Those changes come mostly in the form of 
discussions and anxieties about sociopolitical and technological change. 
These changes have similarities but also differ for every period, which is 
one of the explanations that the concept of privacy was both characterized 
by recurrent features and debates as well as by fluidity in time. We do not 
focus on the judicial and legal aspects of privacy which are covered in the 
legal chapter of this handbook.
1.2.1 Until 1500: Privacy before the Middle Ages
Scholars have traced the history of privacy back to ancient civilizations. 
The sociologist of totalitarian regimes Barrington Moore wrote a social 
and cultural history of privacy in the ancient world. He emphasized that 
‘totalitarian’ regimes throughout history have been trying to control their 
subjects’ lives by either denying them privacy or through surveillance. Moore, 
for example, looked at the Chinese Qin dynasty (221-206 BC) and the Indian 
Maruya Empire (322-187 BC), and stressed how they were unsuccessful in 
controlling privacy as they lacked modern equipment like phone tapping 
or CCTV for surveillance.6
5 As an introduction: Jordheim 2012.
6 Moore 1984.
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Aristotle (384-322 BC) is another common starting point for a historical 
review of privacy.7 Many scholars of privacy consider the distinction Aristotle 
made between the private domestic sphere of the family, the oikos, and the 
public sphere of politics and political activity, the polis, as the f irst classical 
reference to the existence of a distinctive private domain. Both Aristotle’s 
Politics and Ethics cover these subjects. The political philosopher Hannah 
Arendt (1906-1975) made this distinction famous when she argued that this 
split also separated the world of women and children (oikos) from that of 
men (polis), and that this distinction has continued to exist into the modern 
era.8 By using these references, historical reviews of privacy, suggest that in 
over 2200 years of history privacy was mainly understood in the same way.
Several historians have stressed that this view on privacy as an unchanged 
concept is problematic as can be illustrated by the example of the Greek oikos 
and polis. From historical research we know that the oikos differed much 
from our modern nuclear family house(hold) aimed at consumption. The 
ancient household was foremost a place for production, a farm, a catering 
of a much larger family (and their slaves), through which the oikos as a 
group – and not the individuals that made up the oikos – had access to the 
polis. The oikos was the place where traditions of the polis were taught, 
making the oikos a political phenomenon. The role of women was also more 
complex. Religion was pivotal in the polis and women played a central, 
sometimes even decisive, role in religious ceremonies and festivals. This 
makes the (political) influence of women in the polis considerable.9 Since 
the organization of society was made out of groups and people who foremost 
identif ied themselves as a group member, there was only a limited notion 
of individuality if we use a contemporary Western perspective. This makes 
a research that starts from the idealized modern notion of privacy as an 
aspired and equal individual right historically problematic.
1.2.2 Privacy from the Renaissance till the French Revolution 
(ca.1500-1800)
1.2.2.1 The importance of a middling sector
Amongst historians the position now commonly held, is that, in the words 
of Harvard historian Jill Lepore, ‘the history of privacy is bounded; privacy, 
as an aspiration, didn’t really exist before the rise of individualism, and it 
7 For example: DeCew 2018. 
8 Arendt 1998.
9 Nagle 2006. 
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got good and going only with the emergence of a middle class’.10 Privacy 
as a concept is essentially linked to the emergence of individualism and a 
middling sector in society that had both the time to take up intellectual 
labour and – unlike the rulers and the lower strata of society – the liberty 
to choose their own living space.11
We can see the emergence of such a middling group in the period of 
the Renaissance and the Reformation (c. 1450-1650). Merchants, scholars, 
and clergy had the luxury and time to reflect and to write to fellow souls 
about their inner feelings. After the invention of the printing press (c. 1440) 
books and letters were quickly dispersed throughout Europe. When private 
letters are compared to public outlets, one sees how individuals created a 
distinction between the private and the public persona. This is typical for 
the Renaissance. For example, by analysing the work of Thomas More (1478-
1538) Renaissance scholar Stephen Greenblatt shows how More purposely 
draws a ‘calculated distance between his public persona and his inner self. 
(…) His whole identity depended upon the existence of a private retreat’. 
More also built such a retreat in a literal sense, in the form of his house. His 
inner feelings and needs sharply contrasted with More’s most famous work, 
the ironic Utopia. In this antonym work the private (privatus) is identif ied 
as the root to all social injustice and the prime hindrance to the public 
interest. The urge for retreat is a characteristic of the time of Renaissance, 
which can be seen both in monastic and in civic life. With priests seeking 
voluntary periods of seclusion. ‘As the public, civic world made increasing 
claims on men’s lives, so, correspondingly, men turned themselves, sought 
privacy, withdrew for privileged moments from urban pressures’. This was 
one of the driving forces that generated individuality, which is one of the 
key characteristics of the Renaissance.12
The diary became a place of def inition and management of the self and 
thus a place of privacy. According to historian Philippe Ariès, England 
at the end of the f ifteenth century was ‘the birthplace of privacy’, since 
diaries were widely kept there. Private letters, diaries, and autobiographies, 
but also closets and the study got popular.13 However, privacy was not a 
clear positive thing for contemporaries. The linguist and cultural historian 
Cecile Jagodzinski shows that privacy in the days and works of Shakespeare 
(1564-1616) was mainly discussed in a negative manner. In plays like Love’s 
10 Lepore 2007. 
11 Webb 2007.
12 Greenblatt 2005, 45, 46.
13 Phillipe Ariès 2003, 5.
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Labours Lost or The Tempest privacy is portrayed as negative. Solitude and the 
contemplative private are treated as suspicious. They are the ‘instigators of 
vice and political conspiracy’ which are trying to create chaos, and disrupt 
the stability of the natural state in which kings have the divine right to rule.14
1.2.2.2 An emerging individuality
An emerging individuality had a profound effect on society. The Reformation 
(1517-1648) can be viewed as a struggle between collective readership by a 
traditional church authority and hierarchy of the Catholic Church versus the 
authority of the individual believer and his interpretations of private reading 
of the scripture. Jagodzinski shows how the concept of privacy changed in 
the seventeenth century in a context of rising popularity of reading. The 
number of printed books increased, as well as their circulation. Readers 
started to acquire ‘a new sense of personal autonomy, a new consciousness 
of the self’. This helped to shape the concept of privacy to become a personal 
right and the core of individuality. According to Jagodzinski, continuing 
religious struggles in post-Reformation England ‘eventually ratif ied the right 
to individual autonomy in all things (including the religion): and that the 
catalyst for these changes lay in the practice of private spiritual reading’. This 
was not a revolutionary process but a steadily evolving one.15 Two Treatises of 
Government (1690) of the protoliberal and philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) 
are symbolic for this new understanding of privacy as personal autonomy 
and individuality. In his contract theory he argues that cooperation in and 
stability of a political society is the result of the legitimate aim of rational 
individuals to protect their private life, liberty, and property.16
Changes in the understanding of privacy also changed family life and 
housing. In his book on the history of childhood Phillipe Ariès proposes 
that the formation of the modern nuclear family was a result of ‘a desire for 
privacy and also a craving for identity: the members of the family were united 
by feeling, habit and their way of life’.17 This was very much a middle-class 
affair, both the higher and the lower classes still lived in larger groups. In 
the eighteenth century ‘the family began to hold society at a distance, to 
push it back beyond a steadily extending zone of private life’. The layout of 
houses began to change to accommodate the urge for privacy, most strikingly 
by the introduction of a corridor on which rooms opened. Rooms also got 
14 Jagodzinski 1999, 1-25.
15 Jagodzinski 1999, 1-25.
16 Locke 1988.
17 Ariès 1962, 413.
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distinct functions and beds that used to be all over the house ended up 
exclusively in a bedroom. Servants were kept at more distance by installing 
bells, while the introduction of the f irst post services were used for making 
appointments to visit – instead of just dropping by. ‘The rearrangement of 
the house and the reform of manners left more room for private life; and 
this was taken up by a family reduced to parents and children, a family 
from which servants, clients and friends were excluded’, as Ariès states.18
In his book The Secret History of Domesticity the cultural scholar Michael 
McKeon shows how the modern notion of the public-private relation emerged 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England. He describes this 
development throughout the whole private-public spectrum. At the private 
side of the spectrum this is visible in developments like the privatization of 
the family and marriage. McKeon also stresses the political impact of this 
development which becomes apparent at the ‘public extreme’ in the rise 
of contractual thinking, the devolution of absolutism and the shaping of a 
civil society separated from the state.19
The rise of a public sphere in the eighteenth century also had an impact 
on privacy. In Georgian England (1714-1830), printing was deregulated which 
lead to a spectacular rise in periodicals and newspapers. The establishment 
of the private persona became the fundament of citizenship. Those elements 
were combined in the increasing fascination of newspapers, biographers, 
and gossipers for the individual. Those stories circulated in a larger public 
sphere of coffeehouses, clubs, pubs, and playhouses. The effects of this shift 
were clearly visible in how a new class of entertainment professionals, the 
eighteenth-century London ‘celebrities’, protected their good reputation and 
their private feelings. As the cultural historian Stella Tillyard famously wrote: 
‘Celebrity was born at the moment private life became a tradable public 
commodity’.20 For the ‘celebrity’ stage workers, for those who lived in and 
from their life in the public eye, controlling their self-representation became 
very important.21 This relationship between privacy and new communication 
technology (newspapers), which became apparent in eighteenth century 
London, took off in a spectacular way after 1800 and influenced the whole of 
society. From 1800 onwards, the relationship between privacy and technology 
thickens and becomes a recurrent theme in history.22
18 Ariès 1962, 398, 399.
19 McKeon 2007. 
20 Tillyard 2005, 64.
21 Fawcett 2016, 1-22.
22 Lepore 2013.
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1.2.3 Privacy in an age of modern urbanization, communication, and 
state-formation (ca. 1800-1900)
1.2.3.1 Privacy threatened, privacy as an ideal?
It has been argued that after 1800 two interpretations of privacy emerged, 
that have kept their relevance until today. First, this period gave birth to 
the modern ‘surveillance state’ and the concept of the ‘all-seeing eye’ which 
threatened privacy and will eventually lead to privacy’s death.23 In the late 
1780s, Jeremy Bentham developed the idea of the panopticon, a (prison) 
design with guards watching everything without prisoners/ citizens knowing 
when and how. The panopticon is often taken as the starting point of this 
modern rationale.24
This metaphor can only be understood against the background of an 
emerging second interpretation: privacy as an ideal and aspiration for every 
citizen. Legal historians have stressed that the democratic revolutions 
of around 1800 played an important role in the shaping of this ideal. The 
American Revolution was a defence against the right of not being insulted 
by the government. The Bill of Rights (1791) explicitly stated the ‘right of 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’.25 The 
French Revolution gave birth to the Universal Declaration on the Rights 
of Man in 1789. Georges Duby, in volume IV of A History of the Private Life, 
claims that ‘the nineteenth century was the golden age of private life, a 
time when the vocabulary and reality of private life took shape’.26 David 
Vincent in Privacy. A Short History also stresses the importance of the rise 
of the modern household: the members of the household were free and 
secure, behind the front door they could read their books and have intimate 
relationships without interference, here modern privacy could flourish.27
1.2.3.2 Crowded places and new technologies
The rise of two paradoxical views on privacy were a result of the same 
developments. First, they were a reaction to extreme population growth 
which raised the question how to control society as well as maintain 
individual space. When we take the British example we clearly see the 
opportunities and challenges. The British population doubled between 1801 
23 Froomkin 2000, 1463.
24 Vincent 2016, 53.
25 Solove 2006, 4, 5.
26 Ariès, Duby and Veyne 1987. 
27 Vincent 2016, 63.
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and 1851, and had doubled again by 1911, a process that went hand in hand 
with urbanization: up to 80% lived in a city around 1900. As cities grew, 
they became places of strangers in which it was impossible to know every 
person, street, or event. Gaslights were introduced in cities (in London in 
1807) to create more visibility and safety for individuals in the night. Traff ic 
rules were drafted to separate pedestrians from horses and, later, from cars, 
and social rules developed how to keep physical distance in crowded places 
such as train cabins. Separating people and their different tasks, became 
central in Victorian housing design. ‘The family must have privacy’, one 
could read in books on planning. Study, living, kitchen, and dining room 
were separated, servants and family were not expected to share rooms and 
gardens were fenced to offer privacy, seclusion, and intimacy. Of course, 
only the middle and higher echelons of society could afford a house that 
met these conditions but privacy became the ideal for all.28
Secondly new (communication) technology had its impact.29 Written 
correspondence was not new, but new was the well-organized postal sys-
tem that became increasingly reliable, easy, and cheap. In the nineteenth 
century low standard prices were introduced and postmen stopped in every 
town. Together with state investments in schools, the number of people 
in Western Europe that could write and read, and send letters, increased 
dramatically. Innovations such as the telegraph and telephone offered extra 
communication possibilities.30 Journalism flourished in the nineteenth 
century and in the f inal quarter of this century, what has been called New 
Journalism developed: the emergence of the ‘modern’ committed, well-in-
formed, and respectable journalist who wrote columns or tried to f ind out 
what ‘really’ happened. But New Journalism also refers to the emergence of 
American-style boulevardism or mass media newspapers focusing on gossip, 
scandal, and celebrity life.31 Issues of immorality such as political corruption 
or ‘unnatural’ sexual affairs (adultery, homosexuality) were covered. Royals 
turned to the law to prevent privacy insults. A much-cited ruling of Prince 
Albert v. Strange in 1849 prevented that stolen etchings of Prince Albert were 
published. A main argument for the decision was that there existed ‘the 
abstraction of one attribute of property, which was often its most valuable 
quality, namely, privacy’.32 In a mediatized society, privacy literally became 
28 Vincent 2016, 54-61.
29 Lepore 2013.
30 Van der Woud 2013; Henkin 2007; Wenzlhuemer 2015. 
31 Wijf jes and Voerman 2009; Wijf jes 2004. 
32 Mitchell and Mitchell 2012.
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valuable. There are many examples of nineteenth-century elite men and 
royals that in return for money prevented publications of their ‘lapses’. In 
the Netherlands king William II (1840-1849) was blackmailed for supposed 
homosexual relationships, sums of money and lucrative positions prevented 
his enemies from publication.33 Especially the fear of losing their honour 
and reputation made people willing to pay. Newly drafted formal-legal rules 
on adultery, homosexuality, and divorce – another breeding ground for 
scandal – could quite easily turn someone’s private affairs into newsworthy 
public stories.
1.2.3.3 Modern information collecting techniques
Changes of the state and how it was governed had an impact on privacy as 
well. The emerging modern bureaucratic nation-state was clearly represented 
by the establishment of post off ices and the postman in the street, who 
worked on schedule and followed standardized procedures.34 The postal 
system connected the nation and its inhabitants and was, together with 
the security forces like the police and the army, a clear representative of 
the modern state. But the modern state was a paradoxical thing when it 
comes to privacy. On the one hand the government took measures to protect 
privacy, on the other hand it infringed further in private life through data 
collection. For example, it actively engaged in the prohibition of certain 
stories or in forcing newspapers to destroy complete issues when the privacy 
of high-placed persons was threatened. At the same time the government 
structurally collected more and more information. The Census and the 
collecting of Government Records were ‘threats’ to privacy in the nineteenth 
century according to privacy law professor Daniel Solove. In the US the 
number of questions asked during the census dramatically increased from 
only four in 1790 to 142 in 1860.35 In England the General Register Off ice 
collected and archived information on marriage and childbirth since 1801 
but off icials steadily collected more sensitive information on economic 
status, languages spoken, and illnesses for ‘security’ reasons.36
Not surprisingly, in such a context privacy scandals could emerge. Such 
as the one in 1844, when it became known that with permission of sir James 
Graham, Secretary of the Home Department, the post of Italian freedom 
f ighter Giuseppe Mazzini living in exile in London was opened on request 
33 Van Zanten 2014. But only for a while, in the end several anecdotes reached out to the public. 
34 Bayly 2003.
35 Solove 2006, 6.
36 Levitan 2011.
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of the Austrian government. In Parliament Graham denied his actions 
because state security was not a topic to be discussed publicly. It showed 
that state security could and would be used as an argument to intrude on 
privacy.37 Moreover, if and when private correspondence was a matter of 
public concern was a source of scandal throughout the nineteenth century.38
1.2.3.4 The paradox of the liberal state
Although, the nineteenth century is widely regarded as an era of liberalism,39 
one sees how liberal reforms such as freedom of opinion in post, speech, and 
in the press, more room for private entrepreneurship in the media sector and 
new laws to protect individual rights were in reality both an opportunity 
as well as a challenge to privacy. On the one hand the liberal emphasis on 
private space and individual rights that need to be guaranteed by the law 
and the state was supportive towards the development of privacy as an 
individual right. On the other hand, even in an era of liberal reform, citizens 
would only enjoy their privacy when the state granted it to them. As the 
historian of privacy David Vincent puts it: ‘Liberal governmentality derived 
its authority from a deliberate act of withdrawal from the private sphere’.40 
In other words, the liberal state gave privacy to its citizens on certain condi-
tions. The emergence of the modern state made people, therefore, rethink 
their individual privacy and possible threats.
This is clearly visible in the work of the eminent liberal scholar John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873) who dedicated much of his work to the dangers of 
the ‘overgrown state’ for private individuals. He stressed that in a liberal 
democracy, the freedom of private individuals should not be limited by a 
bureaucratic state or other unnecessary forms of state control; interference in 
one’s private life should be only allowed when an individual harms someone 
else.41
From important scandals and debates from this period, we can also derive 
how the emergence of liberal rights in combination with the technological 
and communication developments we discussed above, informed a new 
debate about privacy. The struggle to accommodate new communication 
devices which could expose the private life to ever-larger audiences in often 
novel ways played a crucial role in these debates. Besides the secret post 
37 Vincent 2008. 
38 Kroeze 2008.
39 Kahan 2003. 
40 Vincent 2016, 75, 76 and 118. Based on Barry, Osborne, and Rose, 1996.
41 Held 2016; Mill 1869. 
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example of 1844 and the case of Prince Albert vs. Strange (1849), ‘The Right 
to Privacy’ article of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis of 1890 is a crucial 
text of this period. It was a reaction to the intrusion of boulevardism on 
the private life of the f irst author, whose daughter’s marriage was without 
consent covered in the media.42 The article was a plea for a ‘right to be let 
alone’. This challenged the idea that privacy was a relational thing and only 
to be found in the context of the family and domestic home. In short, the 
text can be seen as one of the f irst pleas for private ‘isolation’, for a desire to 
control personal image and information and for a legal system that would 
protect these rights, an interpretation that would become dominant in the 
twentieth century.43
1.2.4 Privacy in an era of international conflict and the emergence of 
the welfare state (ca. 1900-1970)
1.2.4.1 Extending individual rights
Warren and Brandeis contributed to a more radical interpretation of privacy 
and urged for legal protection but their desire to better protect the private 
individual f it well a broader development of protecting human rights. In the 
twentieth century privacy became a more fundamental and international 
desire, a development which was a reaction to experiences with racism 
in a colonial context and the atrocities and disrespect for private life 
and dignity during the Second World War (1939-1945). For those reasons 
initiatives to strengthen the formal-legal protection of individual rights 
on the international level were widely supported. The United Nations were 
founded in 1945 and article 12 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 stressed that ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy’. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights issued that 
‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence’.44
Still, some other important changes took place on a national scale in 
relation with the emergence of the welfare state. From the beginning of 
the twentieth century, in different Western countries, new laws were 
established that protected vulnerable individuals and their individuality 
42 ‘The Right to Be Let Alone’, 1890.
43 Vincent 2016, 77 and 78. 
44 UN Declaration of Human Rights, see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/
UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf; European Convention on Human Rights, see https://www.echr.
coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. See also Stuurman 2017, Chapter 9 ‘The Age of Human 
Rights’.
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such as children, women, and the elderly.45 Acts that promoted children’s 
rights (in England the 1908 Children’s Act, the Punishment of Incest Act of 
1908 and the Maternity and Child Welfare Act of 1918; internationally also 
the UN Declaration of the rights of the child 1959/1989 could be mentioned) 
allowed the state to intervene in family life when the child was neglected.46 
Women’s rights were strengthened as well. Women were more and more 
recognized as autonomous citizens with an individuality that did not depend 
on their relationship with a man and on their position in the household. Very 
important in this respect was the universal right to vote that was established 
in many countries in the f irst half of the twentieth century. But it was a 
long, and still-lasting struggle. Not only did women lack the right to have 
their own bank account or to work after marriage in countries such as the 
Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s, a ‘modern’ country such as Switzerland 
established full women’s suffrage only in 1971, to name but a few examples.47
These changes were clearly related to the welfare state, which cautious-
ly emerged in the years around the First World War (1914-1918) and was 
embraced by most political groups in the West in the decades after 1945.48 
Besides laws on women and child rights, the welfare state established new 
town planning acts and set basic standards for housing (in Great Britain in 
1918 and 1919 and in the Netherlands with the Housing Law of 1901 and the 
Rental Law of 1950). These acts prescribed that new houses, especially in 
the social housing sector, should have a separate kitchen, an indoor toilet,49 
and preferably three bedrooms so that parents, sisters, and brothers could 
sleep in their own room and have their privacy. Housing acts however also 
contained basic rules about how families were supposed to use their house 
and under what conditions welfare workers were allowed to intervene. In 
the 1950s in the Netherlands, public off icials who selected farm helpers 
for the new Noordoost-Polder selected on how housewives made beds and 
were dressed in unannounced house visits.50 So, the welfare state provided 
a basis for home, security, literacy, income, and health but those collective 
claims always went hand in hand with the right of the state to interfere.51
45 Renwick 2017. In Germany this process started even earlier: Grimmer-Solem 2003. 
46 Vincent 2016, 80. 
47 Adams 2016. 
48 Judt 2007; Keulen 2014.
49 Vincent 2016, 81: Large groups – 20-30% – had no f ixed bath and no water closet. In 1951 in 
Manchester 40% of the homes did not have an exclusive use of a bath. Near-universal availability 
of basic sanitation was achieved after 1975. Across Europe we f ind comparable f igures.
50 Vriend 2014.
51 Young and Willmott 2011; Vincent 2016, 127. 
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New communication and entertainment technology had, again, another 
impact on privacy. The telephone, a nineteenth-century invention, displaced 
the letter as the most important means of communication by 1970. Radio and 
television were new for the twentieth century and were readily adopted in 
the new homes. They were consumer products but also created new forms 
of fear about the harmful effects of too much privacy as authorities became 
suspicious about the moral impact of the television on private and family life.52
1.2.4.2 New fears of the surveillance state
The twentieth century also added another chapter to the fear of the emer-
gence of the surveillance state and its impact on privacy. Although, statistics 
and surveillance had started in the nineteenth century, as did the debate 
on the surveillance state, the twentieth century made it more of a reality. 
Because of the rise of the welfare state, more f iles of individuals were created 
and kept. If people wanted social housing, a pension, or unemployment 
benefits they had to register and apply for support and often had to accept 
inspection at home to determine both the f inancial need and the decency 
and skill set of the prospective recipients. Surveillance, therefore, changed 
from being controlled and supervised by one’s neighbourhood and family 
to an anonymous and systematic control by the state and social welfare 
organizations.53 Other forms of registration were introduced as well. Almost 
nobody used to register for a passport, but from around 1900 a passport was 
needed to travel abroad and the document became universal.54
As part of the surveillance state police, security, and intelligence services 
advanced as well. Criminal organizations were inf iltrated more often by 
police, and they started to use phone taps. In Britain, in 1957 an inquiry 
committee chaired by judge Lord Birkett, investigating the tapping of the 
phone of a barrister of a London gangster, stated:
There is no doubt that the interception of communications, whether 
by the opening or reading of letters or telegrams, or by listening to and 
recording telephone conversations, is regarded with general disfavour. 
(…) [They are] an invasion of privacy and an interference with the liberty 
of the individual in his right to be ‘let alone when lawfully engaged in 
his own affairs.’55
52 Vincent 2016, 91, 93, and 94.
53 For Germany: Lutz 2017. 
54 Bayly 2003.
55 As cited in: Vincent 2016, 105
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The committee expressed reservations for phone tapping for national 
security and thought it best to continue these activities and to not be 
transparent about whom or what was being monitored. In addition, without 
real parliamentary consultation, security organizations extended their 
activities in the period around World War Two and during the Cold War. 
For example, in many Western democracies communists and communist 
organizations were monitored and spied upon in these decades.56
Interestingly enough, at the same time privacy became perceived and 
presented as a core value of liberal democracy during the Cold War. Famous 
books like Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism of 1951 emphasized 
how totalitarian governments could only exist because of their destruction of 
‘the public realm of life’ and by the isolation of every individual – it ‘destroys 
private life as well’.57 George Orwell illustrated the dangers of an illiberal 
state in his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four of 1949. Here, he presented a world 
without private life in which the ‘Thought Police’ controlled everything by 
permanent surveillance.58
1.2.5 Privacy in the computer age (1970-present)
1.2.5.1 The digitalization of privacy
The rise of the computer (1960s), Internet (1983), and World Wide Web (1993) 
in the past few decades has brought the impact of technological change 
on privacy issues at the centre of public debate. Information gathering 
and archiving were central for the modern state since the nineteenth 
century but the introduction of the computer started a whole new debate 
about data collecting and privacy threats. In 1969, Jerry Rosenberg wrote 
The Death of Privacy in which he argued that computers were in use with 
complete access to personal data.59 Arthur R. Miller wrote in 1971 that 
computers would create a ‘surveillance system that will turn society into a 
transparent world in which our homes, our f inances, and our associations 
will be bared to a wide range of casual observers’. The growing concerns 
about state interference can also be derived from the renewed attention 
for Burke’s panopticon concept, for example in Foucault’s Discipline and 
Punish.60
56 Vincent 2008, 116-128; Hooper 1987, 29-31, 104.
57 Deborah 2002; Müller 2013. 
58 Orwell 2008, 165.
59 Rosenberg 1969.
60 Foucault 1991.
 EBSCOhost - printed on 5/7/2021 5:05 AM via VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT AMSTERDAM. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
36 THe Handbook of Privacy STudieS 
Civil unrest urged politicians to take measures. In the Netherlands 
and Sweden in the 1970s, civilians protested against the census and the 
storage of the census data in the new mainframe computers. This led to 
the introduction of a real Privacy Law in Sweden in 1973, the adoption of 
the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data by the Council of Europe in 1981, and to the f irst 
national data protection law in the Netherlands in 1989.61 In Britain in 1972, 
the government issued a committee headed by Kenneth Younger to consider 
legislation on privacy and the United States adopted their Privacy Act in 
1974. Attempts to add fluoride to drinking water as a public health measure 
was annulled by the Dutch High Court in 1973 because the Court thought 
that such far-reaching measures needed a basis in law.62 Thus, interference 
in private life by the government had been acceptable in the welfare state 
of the 1950s but no longer in the 1970s when these forms of interference in 
personal life needed a clear judicial foundation.
But not all contemporaries discussed digitalization as a threat. Some saw 
it as democratization. The computer would destroy the privacy of the typical 
bourgeois family and end the privilege of elites to control their private life, 
property, and information. Thus, in the 1970s privacy was redefined: it was 
used to emphasize the autonomy of the individual rather than the family 
and it concentrated on (the end of) information privacy.63
1.2.5.2 Spread of progressive values?
What by the 1970s was called progressivism further strengthened the idea 
of privacy as an individual and legal right. Clearly the ‘traditional’ marriage 
went into decline in Western society and single life, living together, and other 
forms of non-traditional relationships increased providing more options for 
individuals how to live and where to f ind their privacy. In recent years the 
number of single-person households has even risen to a European average of 
30% of the population. Widespread availability of new and modern houses 
accommodated these personal choices. Legal changes, such as those that 
ended the criminalization of homosexuality or widened the possibility for 
divorce also had a huge impact on individual opportunities.64
61 Vincent 2016, 111 and 112; Overkleeft-Verburg 1995; Council of Europe, Treaty 108, 1981. This 
rise of literature on the end of privacy has continued up until today. See for example, David 
Holtzman 2006: ‘Our privacy is shrinking quicker than the polar ice gap’.
62 Edeler 2009; HR 22-06-1973, NJ 1973, 386 Fluoridering. 
63 Vincent 2016, 113-115.
64 Vincent 2016, 118-129, 212.
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There are even signs that progressive privacy interpretations have become 
global aspirations. Western and non-Western ideas about privacy may still 
differ greatly but have also converged as privacy, at least on paper, has 
become a global aspired human right. The establishment of the earlier 
mentioned UN declaration on Human Rights and the European Convention 
on Human Rights has also supported this change, as well as the fact that the 
European Court of Human Rights has the right to rule on alleged claims of 
interference. Same-sex marriage was f irst introduced in the Netherlands 
in 2001, by 2018 almost 30 countries in all continents have adopted it.65
In sum, although orthodox religious groups and other conservative forces 
may have never accepted these changes and in some Western countries 
have retained their influence, in countries where these liberal-progressive 
values and laws have been established they have remained in place and put 
constraints on societal and state interference with private lives of citizens.
1.2.5.3 The impact of 9/11 and anti-terrorism
In the most recent period, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and the antiter-
rorism laws that were issued in reaction to it, have made privacy a more 
complex and disputed issue. In 2007, Julian Assange’s Wikileaks revealed 
documents about the impact of antiterrorism actions, which stirred up 
emotions on privacy issues. Assange justif ied his actions with the slogan: 
‘Privacy for the weak and transparency for the powerful’. According to him 
we stand at a crossroads because of the rise of ‘[I]nternet that transfers power 
over entire populations to an unaccountable complex of spy agencies and 
their transnational corporate allies’.66 In 2013, as a public warning Edward 
Snowden published classif ied documents about what the government 
had been collecting, including private information, under the umbrella of 
counterterrorism.
Not unlike the era of the Cold War, intelligence agencies are little 
transparent about their actions, and politicians are hardly asking them 
to be. The British Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament’s 
Privacy and Security report of 2015 stated: ‘While the Committee has been 
provided with the exact f igures relating the number of authorisations and 
warrants held by the Agencies, we have agreed that publishing that level 
of detail would be damaging to national security’. In the Netherlands, the 
parliamentary subcommittee on intelligence and security issues is even 
65 For example the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union which 
will be enforced in all the EU member states from 25 May 2018.
66 Assange et al. 2016. 
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called the secretive committee (commissie Stiekem).67 Hence, the main 
line of defence of different Western governments has been in line with 
what we have seen throughout history: whenever infiltrations are reported, 
the government, with support of parliament, neither confirms nor denies 
accusations, all for the sake of security and with reference to the argument 
that those who have nothing to hide, will not be harmed.68
In recent history, different voices can be heard in the debate on privacy. 
Edward Snowden is one of the critical voices when it comes to the ‘noth-
ing-to-hide-argument’: ‘Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy 
because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care 
about free speech because you have nothing to say’. He added that individuals 
do not have to justify the right to be let alone, on the contrary, governments 
should convincingly explain why they collect personal data in the f irst 
place. There is also a growing number of, mainly legal, experts who have 
analysed the ‘nothing-to-hide argument’ and came to the conclusion that 
it is a dangerous, ill-convincing, and false representation of how these laws 
work.69 The larger public seems concerned as well. In 2017 in the Netherlands, 
the Law on the Intelligence and Security Services passed parliament, but a 
popular comedian launched a successful campaign to rally popular support 
to hold a referendum in March 2018 on this ‘Big-Data-Trawl Law’ (Sleepwet). 
The turnout showed that a (small) majority did not support the law, which 
forced the government to make changes.70 The debate is hot-tempered 
because ‘not only privacy is at stake but above all democracy’, as privacy 
sociologist Jan Holvast has claimed.71
On the other hand, there are experts who have nuanced these recent 
fears. The historian of privacy Vincent has stressed that throughout modern 
history there has always been a tendency to overestimate the possibilities 
and techniques, and therefore the dangers, of the surveillance state.72 He 
claims that misreading of the history of privacy contributes to recent fears. 
And unlike critical voices like to claim, there is no historical evidence that 
supports the claim that people were more in control of their personal image 
and private information in the past. The examples of the annoyed Warren or 
the fear of the London celebrities in the nineteenth century illustrate this. 
And although social media may have blurred existing lines too and Facebook 
67 Versteegh 2017.
68 Vincent 2016, 131.
69 Solove 2011. 
70 Lonkhuyzen 2017.
71 Holvast 2009.
72 Vincent 2016, 132-134.
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CEO Mark Zuckerberg may claim that privacy is no longer a ‘social norm’,73 
face-to-face communication is still highly important and many social media 
messages only have relevance for a small group of users. Therefore, some 
scholars have stressed to look at privacy more as a contextual value instead 
of only an individual and absolute principle. The philosopher of technology 
Helen Nissenbaum has stressed the importance of ‘contextual integrity’: 
privacy is about rules and expectations between you and the environment.74 
Clearly, in the contemporary period these rules and expectations are being 
reformulated, as they were in the past, and this explains ongoing debates 
on privacy in society, politics, and science.
1.2.6 Conclusion of the meaning and function of privacy in history
To sum up, from a long-term perspective privacy should not be understood 
as a linear development from less to an ever more complete set of individual 
rights. Nor is the context in which privacy has been discussed f ixed in time. 
In addition, privacy in history was not always valued as something very 
important, nor always as a positive value. Debates about its relevance should 
be understood against the background of the great changes in history such 
as the rise of individualism, the Protestant Reformation, liberalism, and 
the emergence of individual rights, as well as ongoing changes in technol-
ogy and communication. In the early modern era of the Renaissance and 
the Reformation privacy became attached to the individual but this was 
mainly in the context of having a private place in your home for and within 
the household and family life, for example to read or to pray in seclusion. 
Literacy and the rise of the printing press, which improved people’s abil-
ity to read and communicate, contributed to privacy as an information 
issue as well. In a world of emerging liberalism and the modern state in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, privacy became more and more 
associated with protection by the state and the law, also against foreign 
threats. Paradoxically, the state and its security forces were also viewed 
as a danger to privacy, especially its interference in personal life or the 
gathering of personal information. The Second World War and the Cold War 
contributed to a belief that individual human rights, of which privacy was 
one, were the essential elements of a modern democracy which required 
more legal protection, also on the international level. Changes in modern 
73 Johnson 2010. Already in 1999 Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy at the introduction 
claimed: ‘You already have zero privacy. Get over it!’
74 Nissenbaum 2010.
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communication techniques, from the printing press and telephone to the 
computer and Internet, have had a great impact on the way privacy was 
understood as well. All these changes have made privacy a slippery concept 
that is diff icult to grasp in general terms. Yes, it can be said that privacy 
is a form of seclusion, a right, and about the protection of private life and 
personal information, but in what way specif ically requires that one delves 
into the social, political, economic, and international circumstances of the 
historical period one is interested in. We provided an introduction to these 
issues in the text above.
1.3 Classic texts and authors
In this section we will turn to four historical sources on privacy which 
highlight important shifts and developments in the history of privacy. 
Although in the texts the word ‘privacy’ was not always used, or not very 
often, they are about issues that are clearly part of the broader history 
of privacy. Moreover, the sources provide an entrance to how privacy in 
a certain period was understood. We chose Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) 
because his text highlights the relationship between privacy and the rise of 
individualism against the background of the Reformation in the Renaissance 
and early modern era. Thereafter we discuss John Locke’s Second Treatise 
on Government (1690) for his text is a clear example of the importance of 
the rise of liberalism for the acceptance of private individual rights in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. Then we discuss Jeremy Bentham’s 
Panopticon (1791), for his text provides a good introduction into modern 
efforts, and obsessions, to control society and his idea of a panopticon has 
become a metaphor when it comes to discussions about the surveillance 
state up until the contemporary era. Finally, we chose Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis’ ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) for this text is a clear example of 
how in the industrial era individual privacy became defined as the right to 
be let alone, worthy of protection by law. The text can also be read as a clear 
example of individual’s reactions to the growing modern communication 
techniques and growing role of the media on private life in the nineteenth 
century.
1.3.1 Thomas More, Utopia (1516)
Thomas More (1478-1535) was a leading Renaissance humanist. He was a 
chancellor to the English king Henry VIII but against the Reformation and 
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opposed to the views of his patron to split the Church of England from the 
Catholic Church of Rome. More corresponded with many fellow humanists, 
such as Erasmus of Rotterdam. From his correspondence, we know that More 
purposely tried to shield his private life off from his public persona. This 
combination makes More a symbol for the emerging idea of individuality 
that needs privacy, which is one of the key characteristics of the Renaissance 
era. His views on privacy are clearly visible in More’s most famous work: the 
novel Utopia from 1511. It was More who coined the term utopia. Historian 
Quentin Skinner has argued that More wrote Utopia as an ironic satire to 
prove that a perfect society could not exist without private property. This 
interpretation is now widely accepted but is an idea that started to emerge 
in this period. In Utopia More sketches a just society in the form of the Island 
Utopia. On this island there is no private property, but also, or therefore, 
no privacy. Privacy in Utopia is not viewed as a freedom; on the contrary, 
privacy is viewed as highly suspicious.75 To keep its inhabitants in view full, 
in order to make sure that they behave well, there are no private spaces. 
Utopians eat in public halls and do not have a private home. The citizens 
rotate between the houses every year and the houses do not have a lock. 
Even the individual body is not private. In Utopia it is custom to make the 
private parts public to the partner before marriage.76
Thomas More wrote the book in Latin. More smartly used the Latin 
rendering of his name, Morus, which is similar to the Greek word for fool. 
He used this as a device to distance his personal self from the views in the 
text, while at the same time making it clear that the island Utopia is not 
real. Thus, the text shows how Renaissance thinkers created a distance 
and a distinction between their public persona and the inner self which is 
symbolic for the emergence of individualism in society. Secondly, because 
Utopia is an antonym, the ironic function helps to get a clear picture on the 
Renaissance thoughts on privacy. The book remains influential until today. 
For example, it ranks as text number 51 in the collection of one million 
curricula of English-language colleges and universities, while libraries over 
the world today hold over 700 different forms and (language) editions of 
this text, outranking by far any other text with utopia in its title.77
75 Skinner 1987.
76 More 1985.
77 Search in the Open Syllabus Project, via: http://explorer.opensyllabusproject.org/, worldcat.
org.
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1.3.2 John Locke, Second Treatise on Government (1690)
John Locke (1632-1704) is a founder of liberalism and a philosopher who is 
famous for his social contract theory. Locke published his Second Treatise 
anonymously in 1690 as part of his book Two Treatises of Government. The 
Second Treatise was a defence of the Glorious Revolution (1688) in which 
the absolute Catholic King James II was overthrown by Parliamentarians 
in favour of the protestant King William III. The Second Treatise can be 
seen as a counterargument to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) Leviathan (1651) 
in which Hobbes promotes an absolutist government as the solution to 
protect the people from civil war (‘a war of all against all’), which he views 
as the state of nature. Locke had a different view on the state of nature. 
His state of nature is that of law and reason, which would prevent people 
‘to harm another in his life, liberty and or property’. But since there is no 
impartial authority to judge, the state of nature is neither stable nor safe 
for individual humans.
This makes him [man] willing to quit a condition, which, however free, 
is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that 
he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already 
united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, 
liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
Thus in order to protect private life, liberty, and/or property men is willing 
to unite in a society under a social contract. Since the protection of these 
liberties is the main reason for collaboration, a ruler of this society should 
not infringe on those liberties. To make certain that the ruler’s sole purpose 
is to protect those private rights, he is tied to the social contract. When he 
breaks it, the people are entitled to revolt and overthrow the government.78 
So Locke argues that the state has to protect private life and individual 
rights, and has no right to harm them, or only on those conditions agreed 
under a social contract. This is a crucial principle of liberalism as well as 
liberal democracy. From the mid-eighteenth century the thoughts of Locke 
gained new popularity. Most signif icantly was the adoption of his thinking 
on private individual rights (‘unalienable rights […] Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness’) in the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 
(see also section two).79 Thereafter Locke’s writings also became influential 
78 Locke 1988.
79 Glenn 2003, 17, 18.
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in the rising debates on the abolishment of the slave trade and up until 
the contemporary era his work is a point of reference when it comes to 
discussions about individual rights, including privacy.
1.3.3 Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon (1791)
Bentham’s Panopticon from 1791 is a classic text for it has served since its 
publication as a metaphor for what will happen when privacy is disrespected. 
In the twentieth century it became the symbol for modern state’s obsession 
with control, total oversight, and social engineering. His text is the original 
source for contemporary references to the panopticon and the surveillance 
state.
What was the panopticon? The philosopher, utilitarianist, and social 
reformer Jeremy Bentham (1748-1831) presented the panopticon as a proposal 
for social reform. The panopticon is a circular institutional building for 
constant surveillance, most famously in the form of a prison. The name 
panopticon refers to Panoptes, the giant watchman with hundred eyes 
from Greek mythology. The basic idea is that a group of people, such as 
prisoners, could be (cost) effectively supervised by a single watchman from 
a watchtower in the middle. The watchtower should be built in such a way 
that prisoners could not see if the guard was actually looking at them, but 
a rightly designed tower guaranteed that they could be watched at every 
moment. In the words of Bentham: ‘I mean, the apparent omnipresence of 
the inspector (…) combined with the extreme facility of his real presence.’80 
Since it would be impossible for prisoners to verify if the watchman was 
watching them, Bentham predicted that all prisoners would act as if they 
were being watched constantly. This was ‘a new mode of obtaining power 
of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example’. Bentham 
had high hopes for his new inspection model: ‘Morals reformed – health 
preserved – industry invigorated – instruction diffused – public burdens 
lightened – Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock – the Gordian Knot of 
the poor-law not cut, but untied – all by a simple idea in Architecture!’81 
The panopticon is perhaps most famous as an architectural design for a 
prison. Not least because Bentham ordered sketches and unfruitfully tried to 
persuade the British government for years to build a prison according to his 
plans. But Bentham saw the panopticon foremost as a tool of management for 
any institution. His brother would build a panoptical factory, and Bentham 
80 Bentham 2011; Vincent 2016, 53.
81 Bentham 2011.
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saw its surveillance capacities f itting for schools, hospitals, mad-houses, 
and the like.82
Bentham’s description of continuous surveillance has been very influential 
and shaped the thinking of later scholars. It is clearly visible in the constant 
surveillance through telescreens by the totalitarian state in George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949).83 In 1975 the idea of the panopticon gained 
influence once again thanks to the work of the French Philosopher Michel 
Foucault. In his book Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (1975) 
he used ‘panopticism’ as a metaphor for modern disciplinary societies.84 
According to Foucault the panopticon principle is not only used for prisons, 
but the mechanism of constant surveillance is a mechanism that controls 
modern social life. Power structures need docile bodies which are ideal to 
work in factories, create order in military regiments, or strengthen discipline 
in schools. In order to instil docility, the constant threat of surveillance is 
needed to discipline society to behave by its rules and norms. This requires 
a particular structure, that of the panopticon. More recently, for example 
during the Edward Snowden-affair on the global surveillance programmes of 
the National Security Agency, the panopticon was often referred to in order to 
emphasize how in today’s digital age oversight and monitoring are organized.85
1.3.4 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890)
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) shows a 
change. ‘Publicity which had meant the opposite of secrecy’, for men like 
Jeremy Bentham a century ago, ‘had come to mean the attention of the press 
(the opposite of privacy)’, as Jill Lepore argues.86 Moreover, the text is a modern 
plea why there should be a right to be let alone, worthy of protection by law. 
‘The Right to Privacy’ article of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis is therefore 
a classic.87 The article has been called ‘the single most influential article on 
privacy’ and ‘the most profound development in privacy law’.88 They clearly 
responded to the changes of their time. Explicitly Warren and Brandeis referred 
to the ‘recent inventions and business methods’, such as new communication 
technology and mass media – the circulation of newspapers rose by about 
82 Vincent 2016, 52-54.
83 Orwell 2008.
84 Foucault 1991.
85 For example: Rule 2013, A27; Simpson 2013; Julian Sanchez 2014.
86 Lepore 2013, 10. 
87 Warren and Brandeis 1890, 193. 
88 Solove 2006, 10; Vincent 2016, 76.
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1000% between 1850 and 189089 – which threatened personal privacy. Warren, 
through his family fortune a member of the Boston commercial elite, was 
furious when he found out that in his view intimate details of his family were 
publicly shared without his consent: the Boston Saturday Evening Gazette had 
infiltrated into the wedding breakfast of Warren’s daughter and published 
about it.90 ‘The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds 
of propriety and decency’ and ‘Gossip had become trade’, the authors wrote.91 
Warren and Brandeis largely build their argument on Prince Albert v. Strange 
(1849).92 They wanted to protect ‘the sacred precincts of private and domestic 
life’. But the Warren and Brandeis article also reflects a change in how privacy 
should be understood. At issue was a family occasion but their plea was a 
rejection of any form of personal infiltration without clear consent and a legal 
basis, as the article held a plea for ‘the right to be let alone’. Moreover, it was 
a response to the modern world in which ‘solitude and privacy have become 
more essential to the individual’.93 Privacy, especially the right to be let alone, 
was not a universal right, but necessary in a modern era of mass media, and 
so was its legal protection, they argued. The influence of the article of Warren 
and Brandeis is further discussed in the chapter on privacy and law.
1.4 Traditional debates and dominant schools
Although privacy has never been a major theme in the work of historians, when 
we analyse historiography (the history of history writing) we can distinguish 
several influential works and three significant methodological streams of his-
tory writing on privacy: the history of law, social history, and cultural history.
1.4.1 The first wave: History of Law (legal history)
Privacy was f irst explored by historians of law. This f ield is mainly practised 
in faculties of law for the purpose of the development and interpretation of 
the law.94 Due to the nature of common law, this discipline is less well es-
tablished or developed in continental Europe. One should keep in mind that 
law history has a different purpose than much of the work of mainstream 
89 Solove 2006, 10. 
90 Glancy 1979.
91 Warren and Brandeis 1890, 193.
92 Post 1991, 647.
93 Vincent 2016, 77, 78. 
94 For an oversight of the methods and historiography of the history of law: Ibbetson, 2003. 
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historians. The latter tend to work in faculties of arts or of humanities. As a 
result of working separatedly, there is not much cooperation or interaction 
between the mainstream historians and legal historians. The f ield of history 
of law is however a productive field. Newer work on the history of privacy can 
for example be found in David Garrow’s monumental work on the historic 
roots of the judicial struggle for abortion rights which were concluded in 
Roe v. Wade (1973).95 Another subdomain of this discipline is less interested 
in the jurisprudence, but focuses more on the context in which law or 
interpretations came about. A good example is the article of Dorothy Glancy 
on ‘the invention of privacy law’ in which she researches the context of 
boulevardism to explain why Warren and Brandeis wrote their article.96
1.4.2 The second wave: Social History (1960s)
Privacy as a f ield of study found its way into the academic discipline of 
mainstream history through the f ield of social history. It was David Flaherty 
who became a professor of law and history at the University of Western 
Ontario and wrote the f irst monograph which had the history of privacy 
as its main subject. His Privacy in Colonial New England (1972) can be seen 
as a bridge between the f ields of the history of law and social history. The 
book originated from a subsidy of the Association of the Bar of New York 
City to assess the growing concern about privacy at the end of the 1960s. 
Flaherty’s book starts from his belief that privacy is not a modern notion 
but a basic law of biology and ecology. He tried to prove this by turning to 
puritanism in colonial New England, because Puritans in the 1960s also 
had an ambivalent attitude towards privacy. He showed how individual 
New Englanders valued privacy and how with the growth of the colony and 
its economy privacy became more valued as houses could grow larger and 
settlements got more scattered. Moreover, he stressed that the control and 
authority over the personal life waned by the eighteenth century.
The enthusiasm to study the history of the daily life of ordinary people 
which were heretofore underrepresented in history, is typical for social 
history which became the main discipline of history writing in the 1970s. 
The rise of this type of social history can be understood as a democratization 
process within history writing, which mirrored the democratization process 
in society. The discipline used a wide range of methods, from microhistory 
focusing on small examples to the annales approach focusing on long-term 
95 Garrow 1994. 
96 Glancy 1979.
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changes in mentalities. Perhaps the best-known example of an annales 
historian who wrote on the private life and on privacy is Phillipe Ariès from 
France. He wrote Centuries of Childhood: A Social History on Family Life 
(1962), in which privacy is discussed as one of the explanations for changes 
in the treatment of children as children.97 He was also one of the editors of 
the f ive volume-series A History of Private Life (1985-1987).98 In this history 
on daily life from antiquity to the present, the emergence of privacy is one 
of the themes. Diana Webbs’ history of privacy and solitude in the Middle 
Ages is a recent example of the annales school.99
1.4.3 The third wave: New Cultural History (1990s-present)
David Vincent wrote several books on the history of different aspects of privacy, 
such as secrecy and the public discourse on privacy in the 19th century.100 
His Privacy: a Short History is the only monograph that covers the history of 
privacy from the Middle Ages up until the present era.101 Although it is not a 
world history as it focuses primarily on the history of privacy in Great Britain, 
his approach and use of sources is exemplary for a cultural history approach of 
privacy. Starting from accounts of medieval court cases on watching windows 
of neighbours, Vincent leads us through the history of privacy. Vincent’s 
main argument is that history of privacy is not linear. Notions of privacy 
have differed throughout history. Changes in daily life and the development 
of the house and bedrooms as private places are a central theme of his book.
Vincent is a social historian by training but his work is clearly influenced 
by New Cultural History. The New Cultural History approach emphasizes 
the importance of studying language and other social and cultural utter-
ances traditionally neglected by historians, with the help of (insights from) 
language, narrative, and discourse theory. The influence of New Cultural 
History is very visible in David’s book on the history of privacy: I Hope I Don’t 
Intrude. The book discusses the changing concept of privacy by studying 
nineteenth-century plays. The book title is the catch phrase of Paul Pry, the 
main character and eponymous of a very popular play of the time. Moreover, 
the work of Fawcett on celebrity and privacy in the eighteenth century f its 
this category.102 Cultural-history studies on privacy primarily look at privacy 
97 Ariès 1962.
98 Especially in the third volume: Aries 2003. 
99 Webb 2007.
100 Vincent 2008; Vincent 2015. 
101 Vincent 2016.
102 Fawcett 2016.
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in terms of reputation and domestic life. In the last years cultural histories 
used artefacts or personal letters as main sources to study privacy in the 
early modern era (ca. 1500-1750), such as is the case in Cecile M. Jagodzinski 
Privacy and Print: Reading and Writing in Seventeenth-century England (1999) 
or Lena Cowen Orlin’s Locating Privacy in Tudor London (2010).103
Cultural history has also become the main method for political historians. 
This becomes visible in the recent works on privacy, modernity, and the 
development of the modern state. Examples are Higgs’, Moran’s, and Frost’s 
work on secrecy and the state, focusing on the endeavours of the British and 
the United States Government in keeping off icial secrets secret.104 Kathrin 
Levitans A Cultural History of the Census shows how society responded to 
the introduction and use of census data. The book is a good example of how 
cultural history has entered the f ield of the history of privacy in relation with 
policy history.105 Not only privacy policies and the ‘politics of privacy’ are now 
more commonly researched, but also the private aspects of elites and their 
struggle to maintain their privacy. Examples are the recent autobiography 
of Jeroen van Zanten of the Dutch King William II or popular histories on 
the private aspects of royalty such as Michael Paterson’s A Brief History of 
the Private Life of Elizabeth II.106
To sum up, the historiography of privacy has broadened in recent decades. 
It changed from a purely legal history into something to be understood in 
the context of social, political, and technological change that has had an 
effect on both elites and common people as social and cultural historians 
have stressed. Moreover, in the recent period there is a tendency to not 
only see privacy as a history of emerging individualism, Protestantism 
and liberalism, like in historical studies on the Renaissance. Privacy is now 
more often researched in relation with housing, modern state formation, 
globalization, and technological and communication innovation, for example 
in the recent book of David Vincent. This has led to the result that by now 
privacy is treated as a more complex and paradoxical phenomenon, worthy 
of studying on its own terms. In the section below, we will further elaborate 
on how changes in the f ield of history writing have affected how historians 
understand and deal with privacy.
103 Jagodzinski 1999; 2010.
104 Higgs 2003; Moran 2013; Frost 2017.
105 Levitan 2011. 
106 Van Zanten 2014; Paterson 2012.
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1.5 New challenges and topical discussions
In 1980, David Flaherty was one of the f irst to draw attention to the respon-
sibilities of the historian for the privacy of his research objects. In contrast 
to neighbouring f ields such as the social sciences and law, historians were 
late to give attention to privacy of sources. The main reason is that historians 
were long occupied with writing about people who no longer lived.107 This 
is clearly related to the professionalization of history since the nineteenth 
century. Central in this professionalization process was the belief that 
historians could best study histories of people, events, or cultures that had 
come to an end. This assertion, often summarized in Hegel’s quote: ‘the owl 
of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk’ was a guiding 
principle for historians. This has changed since the 1970s, through the 
emergence of the f ield of contemporary history or Zeitgeschichte. As a result, 
historians started researching and writing about processes that still last and 
about people still alive.108 Moreover, especially in the American context, 
historians became more conscious of privacy because they increasingly 
made use of the Freedom of Information Act to retrieve sensitive government 
information for historical research.109
The emergence of the relatively new f ield of oral history has had an 
impact as well. One of the goals of oral history was (and is) to give voice to 
the voiceless in history, by interviewing people in length about their daily 
lives or about traumatic experiences.110 Unlike much of the ethnographic 
research in the social sciences, oral history interviews are typically not 
anonymous and they are being collected to be archived and thus are being 
kept publicly available for further research.111 Asking for consent has become 
part of professional oral history research. The adoption of consent forms 
started in the United States where oral history has a stronger developed 
tradition of interviewing elitist groups who were concerned with controlling 
their views. By 1994, the Oral History Association had adopted ethical 
guidelines in which the interviewee got options to put restrictions on the 
accessibility of the information, to restrict access to the archives, or to 
request for anonymity and confidentiality.112
107 Flaherty 1980.
108 Palmowski and Spohr Readman 2011.
109 Flaherty 1980, 421.
110 Keulen and Kroeze 2012; Thompson 2000. 
111 Thompson 2000.
112 Boschma and Mychajlunow 2003.
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Changing copyright laws have influenced the f ields of (oral) history and 
archiving in recent decades. Up until 1989 it was typical to have an informal 
understanding about consent in the social sciences and oral history research 
in the United Kingdom. Access to archives was generally an informal issue 
between researcher and archivist. Nowadays archives have to ensure that 
copyright is transferred to the archive or a licence is needed which approves 
broad public access while leaving the copyright with the producer of the 
archived material or interviewee.113 Consent forms and copyrights may be 
an off icial solution to make consent and privacy more transparent, but this 
is not the end of the matter. These legal solutions lead to new dilemmas and 
problems for historians, as is discussed in the edited volume Doing Recent 
History.114 Laura Clark Brown and Nancy Kaiser describe how archives 
struggle with interpreting privacy laws in the archival context. At f irst 
archives attempted to develop policies for sensitive materials but this proved 
to be unworkable as every new set of material brought its own unprecedented 
challenges. Now archives are inclined to turning to ‘legal loopholes’ in order 
to work around highly specialized privacy laws if they attain school records 
or hospital archives.115 More information on privacy and archives can be 
found in the chapter on archival studies in this book.
In the same volume Gail Drakes sheds light on privacy laws and intel-
lectual property rights. She argues how the expansion of copyright laws in 
the United States since the Copyright Act of 1976 has hindered historians 
to use newsreels or TV programmes as their content is privately owned or 
stored behind pay walls. Another example is the use of copyright and the 
‘right to publicity’ laws to maintain, protect, or polish the image of a family 
member posthumously. The use of these laws has restricted the access to 
historical information on certain individuals, even after their death.116
The rise of women’s history and the subject of privilege in the f ield of 
history in recent decades has had another impact on historians working 
on privacy-related topics. Feminists have pointed at the politics behind 
private-public distinctions and have criticized dominant notions of non- 
interference and privacy. What is considered private and privacy by someone, 
may be an urgent public matter for another. They also have made historians 
aware of power relations in interviewing. The historian Joan Sangster for 
example has argued that it is impossible for an interviewer to be detached 
113 Thompson 2000.
114 Potter and Romano 2012. 
115 Brown and Kaiser 2012.
116 Drakes 2012, 85.
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and objective about the (interview) subject. She has also questioned the 
democratic assumptions of oral history by pointing out that differences in 
status, background, gender, or class between interviewer and interviewee 
could lead to ‘unequal, intrusive and potentially exploitative relationships’.117 
For example, who decides what is ‘true’ when the interviewee, referring to 
his or her memory, and the historian, referring to historical knowledge, clash 
on the meaning of a subject? This debate has since widened and plays an 
eminent role in Afro-American History, postcolonial history, and the history 
of underprivileged groups. For example, was the collection of human remains 
by physio-anthropologists, the production of photos of naked indigenous 
people by Westerners and their exhibition in colonial museums, even up 
until today, a breach of privacy? And how can it be redressed?118
These considerations have also influenced archiving. In a recent publi-
cation, Michelle Moravec, a scholar on women’s history and digital history, 
asks herself the question how we should treat ethics, consent and privacy of 
interviewees in paper magazines with small circulations amongst likemind-
ed readers, which are now being digitized and made freely accessible to the 
world.119 One recent reaction to this debate is that archives are starting to 
adopt restrictions to full access for the general public. They grant only full 
access to specif ic communities to ‘their’ materials.120
The lack of structural archiving of online information is one of the most 
important recent challenges. Whereas primary sources, printed newspapers, 
books, and many oral history collections are collected and categorized 
by national and local archives or libraries, websites are typically not. The 
Dutch situation is exemplary and not an exception. Here, every online 
published article of the largest news organization of the Netherlands, the 
publicly f inanced NOS, from before 2010 has disappeared. Hundreds of 
thousands of online articles from the largest Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf 
and the complete online archive of free newspapers (Spits, De Pers, DAG.
nl) suffered the same fate.121 The problem is related to continuous updates 
of digital online search, storage, and visual tools that will also continue in 
the future. Adobe has already announced to stop supporting the video tool 
Flash by 2020, threatening the accessibility of millions of online movie clips 
from individuals and organizations. The same is true for Data Management 
117 Sangster 1994.
118 Sysling 2017. 
119 Moravec 2017, 186.
120 Brown 2016.
121 Sedee 2018.
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Systems (DMS) of organizations including the government. By updating or 
replacing software older DMS versions cannot be read, making digital (gov-
ernmental) archives completely inaccessible, which hinders the democratic 
control and legitimation of decision-making.122
The lack of a structural approach and the unavailability of past online 
data to the larger public makes online data accessibility highly dependent on 
arbitrary decision-making and to those who have the means and interests to 
dig up lost information. From an academic and democratic perspective this 
is not desirable. For the near future historians and archivists have to rethink 
this dilemma, also in relation to the ‘right to be forgotten’ adopted in the 
EU.123 The newly proclaimed ‘right to refuse to be researched’ which questions 
whether ‘overstudied others’ – such as native communities, ghettoized 
and orientalized communities – benef it themselves from the ethics and 
usefulness from social science research,124 will cause further complications 
but nonetheless makes debating those issues inevitable.
1.6  Conclusion
The history of privacy shows that privacy has been understood as and in 
relation to seclusion, individual rights and protection of personal information 
which requires protection from the law and the government. Secondly, the 
history of privacy shows that debates on privacy can be understood as fears 
about the impact of new information technology, government interference 
in personal life and the rise of the so-called surveillance state. Moreover, 
to explain and understand how privacy was understood in specif ic time 
periods, the treatment of privacy as a context-dependent phenomenon is 
needed.
As the meaning of privacy is context-dependent, opportunities for and 
threats towards privacy are highly related to broader societal developments. 
Of these broader developments, several have been distinguished and dis-
cussed in this chapter but we briefly sum them up here. First, changing 
morals, cultural and religious ideas about the individual, family, household, 
and ‘natural’ relationships have had an effect on privacy. Second, privacy 
has been influenced throughout history by political changes on the national 
122 For a Dutch example: paragraph 7.2.2: Kamerstuk II 2014/15 33 606, nr. 4. Hoofdrapport 
Parlementair Enquête Woningcorporaties.
123 EU, Judgment of the Court in Case C131/12 ‘the right to be forgotten’ (13 May 2014).
124 Tuck and Yang 2014.
 EBSCOhost - printed on 5/7/2021 5:05 AM via VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT AMSTERDAM. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
Privacy from a HiSTorical PerSPec Tive 53
and international level, especially the rise of the idea of individual rights, 
including privacy, and the acceptance of an individual sphere which the 
state, society, and legal system should respect and protect from internal 
and external oppression. The development of liberal-democracy – with 
individual freedom and the non-interference principle as its core values – 
and the internationalization of human rights in the past decades have had 
a big impact on the politics of privacy, and the history of privacy. Finally, 
technological change, especially in the f ield of infrastructure, media, and 
communication, from the printing press up to Internet, have had a great 
impact on privacy matters and will continue to do so.
These changing technological, political, cultural and judicial shifts 
are not only worthy of historical research but have had an impact on the 
profession and the ethics of the historian and historical research as well. 
With the development of digital databases and online sources new technical 
possibilities have emerged but these have given rise to new debates on how 
to deal with privacy and accessibility. Debates about the essence of privacy 
will continue and thus make privacy a fruitful object of study for historians 
but also a matter of ethical reflection for citizens, politicians, and historians 
alike. Clearly, privacy is not only a contextual and relational issue but also 
a paradoxical one.
Further reading
David Vincent’s Privacy: a Short History (2016) is the only available mono-
graph on the history of privacy and provides an introduction to privacy in 
history. Other suggestions for further reading are mentioned in Chapter 
4 and throughout the text. Alternatively, one could check the references.
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